This paper examines governance explanations for the discount of preferred shares to common shares in the Russian market. Conflicts between shareholder classes may help explain the discount. However, for this to be the sole explanation the estimated models suggest that the magnitude of future adverse shareholder events would have to be very high. Nevertheless, evidence of a common factor potentially related to governance seems evident in the data, implying that corporate control issues may at least be partially responsible for the observed preferred share discount.
...Russia has a strategic goal -to become a country that makes competitive goods and renders competitive services. All our efforts are committed to this goal. We understand that we have to solve questions pertaining to the protection of owners' rights and the improvement of corporate governance and financial transparency in business in order to be integrated into world capital markets. Vladimir Putin's speech at the World Economic Forum in Moscow (10/30/01) It is widely believed by participants in the Russian market that corporate governance issues are at least as important as fundamental economic factors in the valuation of Russian securities. In fact, this is what makes the Russian markets so appealing for academic research. Governance in Russia presumably has a first-order, rather than a second-order valuation effect, an observation that may explain why many Russian companies look attractive based on various valuation metrics. For example, oil firms currently appear to be undervalued on the basis of the ratio of reserves to their stock price. These attractive valuations, however, are meaningless to minority shareholders if managers or a controlling shareholder block can transfer resources to themselves. Hence corporate governance issues have attracted considerable investor attention. One of the leading Russian investment banks, Troika Dialog, publishes a weekly newsletter Corporate Governance Weekly. The publication discusses changes in laws and regulations, reports legal cases, and discusses corporate events. Undoubtedly, their customers consider this information value-relevant.
The emerging awareness of corporate governance issues in the last two years has, perhaps, lead to some positive changes in the Russian corporate governance landscape. For example, there are now a few cases in which minority shareholders have successfully defended their rights.
Nevertheless, a natural presumption about the primary determinants of share price in Russia is that issues of control far outweigh such measures of earnings and asset values -hence the quote from President Putin above. This paper explores an odd empirical deviation from the law of one price that might appear -at first -to be due to the relatively poor legal protections for minority shareholders in Russia. In order to understand this deviation, the analysis examines models of minority expropriation designed to parameterize this intuition. It finds that assumptions regarding the magnitude and timing of expropriation would have to be so extreme as to be incredible -even in the context of Russia's rough and ready corporate environment. For those who insist on a pure corporate control explanation, this leaves the conclusion that extreme investor priors about expropriation have very large effects on the valuation of Russian securities.
The empirical analysis focuses on the relative pricing of the common and preferred shares of Russian companies. These securities differ only in their relative proportions in the equity capital structure, and in the type of issues on which they vote. In addition, preferred shares have a novel constraint on dividends that makes it easy to model their relative value to common. Unlike typical U.S. preferred stocks, which have a promised annual cash payment, the dividends of Russian preferred shares are legally bounded below by the dividends to the common. If, as normally assumed in equity valuation, the stream of future dividends represents all the benefits that can accrue to shareholders, then the common and preferred valuation ratio should be reversed -the preferred should always sell for more than the common. In fact, they almost never do. In this paper, we investigate whether this discrepancy may be the result of the potential for expropriation of one class of shareholders by another.
1 While corporate control issues may not fully explain the discount this paper does not claim the unexplained part must be due to irrationality in the market. Indeed while that may be true, it may instead be that the price discrepancy arises from the potential for multiple market equilibria such as those found in Spiegel (1998) .
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It is well known that differential voting rights can account for large pricing differentials in some markets (c.f. Zingales, 1994&1995) . However, a useful question is whether the pricing differential between voting and non-voting shares correctly estimates the ex ante value that can accrue to one class of shareholders. This paper builds a simple model of expropriation and then evaluates it using current Russian company share prices and dividends. Empirically it appears that the magnitude of future adverse shareholder events will have to be very high to justify the preferred share discounts that currently prevail. A factor analysis is then conducted in order to assess whether the risk of such expropriation events is idiosyncratic or systematic. The results indicate that there exists a common factor potentially related to investor perceptions about corporate governance. Thus, at least some of the relative discount may be due to corporate control issues. 
Russian Preferred Shares
When the Russian government privatized its industries, for many firms, it created two classes of stock. The first, common shares, are typical of those found in many western countries. The second, however, is relatively unique. At the time, the government wanted to protect each firm's employees, while simultaneously giving them a stake in their own firm. To do so, "preferred" shares were created and distributed. These shares are very different from those normally seen in the U.S. and European markets in that they come with special voting and cash flow rights. The apparent purpose of these rights is to ensure that the preferred shares remain at least as valuable as the common.
However, despite these protections the common nearly always sells for more than the preferred.
2 This, of course, means that the definition of net profits can be crucial to valuation. In recognition of the potential for concealing profits to the detriment of preferred shareholders, Russian regulators in the year 2001 "tightened" the definition of accounting profits. In fact, however, most Russian companies have been paying out, rather than avoiding, significant preferred dividends. (See Table 1 , which lists the dividends paid on common and preferred shares for nine firms.)
4
Typically the answer to a "puzzle" like this is that the price of the common includes control, and liquidity premia. Of course, such models can produce relative market prices like those observed in the Russian data. But, as the analysis presented here shows, such explanations are difficult to reconcile with the size of the price discrepancy. Empirically, the difference in liquidity between the two securities is not that large. This leaves only the hypothesis that some fairly dire scenarios await the preferred shareholders with a high degree of probability in the very near future. Thus, this paper presents something of puzzle in the sense of the famous "equity premium puzzle." Yes, corporate control models can explain the observed phenomena, but the estimated parameters from such models do not seem reasonable.
Russian companies are allowed to issue bonds, common stock, preferred stock, warrants and convertible bonds. For the purposes of this paper the preferred shares have two special rights of particular salience. First, most company charters require that preferred shares receive a dividend at least equal to some fixed percentage of the annual net profits, often 10%.
2 (Note, they differ from western preferred shares that typically offer a fixed annual monetary amount.) Second, the preferred shareholders must receive a dividend at least as large as the dividend given to the common shares.
A typical corporate charter such as that for Surgutneftegaz spells this out as follows:
The total amount of the dividend on each preferred share shall be fixed at 10 percent of the net income of the Company at the end of the last financial year divided by the number of stock which constitutes 25% of the company's share capital. If the amount of dividends paid 4 By law the preferred can only represent up to 25% of a firm's capital as calculated via the original par value of the preferred and common equity. This implies that even if the preferred shareholders unanimously oppose a measure it will pass if the common votes at least 2 to 1 in favor. On the other hand, anybody that owned 100% of the preferred stock and 1/3 of the common would have voting control. Thus, even in this case, it is not clear that control issues should either negatively or positively influence the value of the preferred shares relative to the common.
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by the Company on each common stock in a certain year exceeds the amount of dividends payable on each preferred stock, the amount of dividends payable on the latter must be increased to the amount of dividends payable on the common stock. The Company shall have no right to pay any dividends on the preferred stock otherwise than in the manner provided for by its Articles of Incorporation.
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Thus, relative to the common shares, the preferred shareholders have apparently been promised the larger cash flow stream. As a result, for corporate control issues to explain the observed prices one needs to assume that at some point an entity will figure out a way to circumvent the charter's language and transfer cash flow from the preferred to the common.
The above discussion naturally leads to the question of just how much protection has been afforded the preferred shareholders. Cash flow promises are worthless unless backed up with sufficient control rights. Recognizing this, Russian company charters protect the preferred shares' dividends against splits and reverse splits. In other words, companies are not allowed to simply increase dividends to the common shareholders by a factor of ten by splitting each share of common ten for one. Other protections vary across firms. Some Russian companies simply pool all of the equity votes when determining if a particular measure has or has not passed. 4 Other firms offer the 6 preferred shareholders even more explicit protection. For example, the Surgutneftegaz charter states that in the event of proposed . . . modifications or amendments to the Charter may affect the rights and interests of the first issue Preferred Stock owners . . . the decision has to be ratified by those owning two thirds of the Preferred Stock . . . With this clause in place, and sufficient legal protection via the courts, it would appear that the preferred shareholders should be protected against any value transfers to third parties.
Given the legal protections afforded to the preferred shareholders, why do they sell for less than the common? One obvious answer is that via clever legal maneuvering somebody will find a way around even the strongest protections, thus draining value from the preferred to the common shareholders. Several international studies on voting rights confirm that control is valuable.
According to Levy (1983) , Rydqvist (1996) , Horner (1988) , and Zingales (1994) premiums are paid for voting control in Israel, Sweden, Switzerland, and Italy. Hanouna, Sarin, and Shapiro (2001) estimate the value of control for a sample of transactions in G7 countries. They report control premiums in the United States of approximately 30%.
It is important, however, to study specific mechanisms by which voting control translates into altered shareholder group cash flows since this ultimately determines valuation. Thus, this paper goes beyond a simple statement that voting rights account for the valuation discrepancy. Instead, it develops two simple models of expropriation and then evaluates them with current share price and dividend data. The estimated parameters indicate that if future adverse shareholder events are to explain the data, they will have to be very strong and happen very quickly. The paper concludes with a factor analysis to assess whether the risk of such expropriation events is idiosyncratic or systematic. Here the findings indicate that there may very well be a common factor potentially 7 related to governance. So, while governance issues undoubtably explain some portion of the observed relative valuations, other explanations would also seem to be needed. The paper's structured as follows: Section 2 describes the history and basic characteristics of the Russian stock market. Section 3.1 looks at the relative liquidity of the preferred and common shares. Section 3.2 examines several corporate control explanations for the observed common to preferred price ratios. Section 3.2.1 estimates a wealth transfer model, and Section 3.2.2 a takeover premium model. Section 4 looks at the related literature on the corporate control premium in other countries. Section 5 tests for a common corporate governance factor that may be influencing the common to preferred price ratio. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
The Russian Stock Market

History
Over the past five years, the privatization of the Russian economy has virtually undone the most famous nationalization of industry in history. In 1917, when most Russian corporations were acquired or seized by the revolutionary government, the domestic and international market in Russian debt and equity instruments was one of the most active in the world. It operated under a set of securities laws that had developed over the course of a century, beginning with the founding regulations of the Saint-Petersburg stock exchange in 1816. In the decades before the Russian Revolution, the control of much of the nation s natural resources and industrial assets were held by foreign and domestic investors, including oil fields, mines, railroads, tramways, electric utilities and banks, to name only a few. of $216 million in trading on one day also occurred on October 3, 1997 -over 100 times the average daily volume two years previously.
The Crash of 1997
At the end of October 1997, the Russian stock market tumbled. The RTS Index lost 93% of its value, falling from 571.66 on October 6, 1997 to an all-time low of 38.53 on October 5, 1998.
The crisis of 1998 not only destroyed the value of the Russian stock market, but also brought trading to a near halt. On August 13, 1998, the Russian market closed after the first hour of trading as the average market price dropped 6.5%. The average daily trading volume on RTS for the last six months of 1998 was $8.9 million. There were many days in September and October when trading 
The Historical Price Performance of Russian Preferred Shares
As noted earlier, Russian law states that the preferred shares must receive a cash flow at least as large as the common. Thus, it appears that the price ratio of the common to the preferred should never exceed unity. One can test this relationship by looking at the following five Russian
Rostelecom (RTKM), and Surgutneftegas (SNGS). These firms have been selected since they have actively traded preferred and common shares on both the Russian and U.S. stock exchanges (the latter via ADRs). As of October 25, 2001, common and preferred shares of these firms accounted for over 53% of the market capitalization of the RTS Index. 6 One caveat -the entire analysis ignores the U.S. volume in ADRs and volume in other nondomestic securities markets, which may substantially influence a particular trader's ability to get into or out of a position.
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Explaining the Common/Preferred Price Ratio
Liquidity
Liquidity differences across securities may offer the simplest potential explanation for the observed preferred to common price ratio. If the preferred are less liquid they will presumably sell for less, even if they have higher expected future cash flows. Table 3 presents some evidence on this issue. Panel A shows that the volume of trade in the preferred shares for each firm is significantly lower than the volume of trade in the corresponding common. In terms of total dollars traded, the common shares experience two to ten times as much volume. However, these figures converge to a large degree when divided by the market value of each class. 6 Thus, trading volumes in each security class appear to be roughly proportional to their market value -an expected result if the relative liquidity levels are similar.
Another way to look at the liquidity issue is via a comparison with U.S. securities. Table 3 Panel B reports the results from a matching sample of U.S. firms. This sample contains the ten stocks closest in market value (five above and five below) to each Russian security in our sample.
That is, each Russian firm has ten matching U.S. firms for its common and another ten for its preferred. Not too surprisingly, the U.S. firms are a lot more liquid than their Russian counterparts.
For many of the comparison groups the U.S. market has almost 100 times the trading volume.
While the U.S. market is clearly more liquid overall, if one looks across pairs another pattern emerges. For any one firm, the U.S. matching sample for the common tends to have considerably more liquidity (relative to market value) than the set used to match the preferred. For example, the Rostelecom ratios for the common and preferred trading volumes (relative to market value) are 0.352 and 0.263 respectively. For the matching U.S. sample they are 3.001 and 1.361. Thus, many of the Russian preferred issues appear to be have more trading volume relative to their common counterparts than one would expect from an examination of U.S. companies with equivalent market values.
Although it is commonly accepted that liquidity is relevant to valuation, no researcher has ever suggested that the liquidity premium for small stocks in the U.S. is anywhere near the levels needed to reconcile the prices of the Russian preferred and common shares. Consider then Table 3 as a comparison of the trading volume in small U.S. companies (those matched with the Russian preferred shares) and large U.S. companies (those matched with the common). The table suggests that liquidity drops off with size somewhat faster in the U.S. than in Russia. Thus, it seems reasonable to conjecture that the liquidity premium for small U.S. companies puts an upper bound on how large a liquidity premium can exist in the Russian market for preferred shares. Overall, it seems unlikely that liquidity can explain more than a small fraction of the observed Russian preferred share discount.
Corporate Control
For corporate control issues to explain the price discrepancies between the Russian common and preferred shares then at some point in time the common shares must expect to receive a larger cash flow than the preferred. This differs from the simple statement that corporate control issues have a large impact on security prices. For example, imagine that management can expropriate a 7 Even this is becoming more difficult as there are emerging ever more binding restrictions on what can be done to make this happen. For example, in 1999 Viksunsk Pipe tried one of the widely used tricks for diluting minority shareholders. In this ploy, the Board at the Annual General Shareholders' Meeting (AGM) or Extraordinary General Shareholders' Meeting (EGM) of the company authorized a secondary issue of common shares, to be placed with insiders via closed subscription, which dilutes the common. Shareholders opposed to the issue were offered a redemption price that was substantially lower than the price, at which the new issue is placed, P pl . Minority shareholders could not participate in the subscription, but they also did want to sell their shares at an artificially low price. Viksunsk Pipe offered prices set at P pl = $10.7 and P red = $3, where P red is the redemption price. Dissenting minority shareholders consolidated 9.4% of the charter capital and demanded that the company redeem their shares at a fair price. The shareholders ultimately won the battle, and reached an agreement to put their shares to the company at $10 per share. While this is only one example, it illustrates the kind of corporate conflicts and legal changes that are happening in Russia right now.
15 large fraction of a firm's cash flows. 7 That in and of itself should not cause the preferred shares to sell for less than the common. For better or worse, the siphoned off cash flows do not aid the marginal holder of the common; an ordinary investor that cannot expect to share management's private benefits. Thus, while corporate control may strongly impact the absolute values across security classes, it can only effect relative prices by somehow diverting future cash flows from one class to the other. For the common to sell for more, its marginal holder must expect to reap cash flow benefits or in a competitive equilibrium the price will not be bid up past that of the preferred.
A Model of Direct Wealth Transfers from the Preferred to the Common
Based upon the above discussion consider the following simple perpetual growth model, 
it is natural to assume that it arises from a constant "plowback" rate of the firm's earnings (E) into new capital, E(1-c -p ). Let ROE represent the firm's return on equity, then g = ROE×(1-c -p ).
Absent issues of expropriation, the ratio of the price of the preferred to the common will simply equal the ratio of their current dividends. However, under the hypothesis that control issues explain the relative pricing of the common and preferred shares the model needs to allow for future transfers of cash flows. To do so assume that at some date T the preferred shareholders will have their shares swapped for shares of the common. Let represent one minus a swap ratio of common shares for preferred shares. 8 A value of zero implies that the common is swapped one for one in proportion to the dividends being paid to each class, and a value of one implies full expropriation of the preferred shareholders. The most striking result of the analysis is that, given most reasonable expropriation rates (60% or less), the time to expropriation would have to be very soon to justify the current price differential between Russian common and preferred shares. In particular, for Surgutneftegaz, the only way to justify the observed market prices -even with our "disaster scenario" models -is to assume that the market anticipates a fairly substantial wealth transfer from preferred to common in the next few years. Sophisticated investors in Russian shares are more equipped than we to judge the reasonableness of these assumptions, but even in the fluid regulatory framework of the modern Russian securities markets, such expropriation assumptions would seem to be dire.
Expropriation via Takeovers
Recent 10 Whether or not common shareholders of the three subsidiaries were given an attractive offer may be debatable. Still, preferred shareholders were offered only half as much.
To test the hypothesis that differential takeover terms for the common and preferred shareholders explains the observed differential start with the perpetual growth model developed in Section 3.2.1. Now, drop the assumption that at date T a direct wealth transfer takes place, and replace it with the assumption that a takeover occurs instead. Further assume that the common shareholders can capture all of the acquisition premium from the takeover. Now, the only difference between the two share prices is the expected discounted future value of the per-share acquisition premium. Thus, the preferred's value equals:
and the common's:
11 Note that the fitted values are set to rationalize today's price. Thus, it is not the case that the results are due to a systematic undervaluation of the common stock's future cash flows absent a takeover. Rather the model produces numbers such that both the takeover payout and the future cash flows discount to the current market price.
where m equals the takeover premium, and T the takeover date. The price ratio can thus be expressed as
There are again four free unobservable parameters g, r, m, and T. assumptions it seems possible to use a takeover premium model to explain some small part of the structural relationship between preferred and common shares, but not most of it. The results generally indicate that even if a takeover were to occur in the very near future the preferred shares offer the better investment value. Consider the case where the merger premium equals nine times the value of the common stock's future cash flows. 11 For discount rates between 5% and 15% four out of the eight observed price ratios cannot be explained via the model, even if a takeover were to occur today. For one of the remaining firms, investors need to believe that such a takeover will occur in the next six years. Thus, even a significant takeover premium can only explain the data in three out of the eight cases. Table 5 also includes the implied price-earnings ratio at which the takeover would occur 12 Given the model's assumptions this ratio is independent of time, since the expected takeover price grows in proportion to the firm's projected earnings.
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under the model's assumptions. 12 In many cases they seem too low, and when they are not then T seems large enough to explain the pricing discrepancies as takeover premiums. However, this hides a number of faults. First, earnings in Russia have been growing at an anemic rate. Thus, given the historical data, the purchaser is buying a cash flow that seems as likely to go down as up. Second, earnings growth has been weak despite relatively low payout ratios. It is this combination that makes it difficult for the model to explain the data under reasonable assumptions. The current holders of the equity appear to be paying a very high price, for what seem to be limited immediate cash flows, and future cash flows will need to depart from the historical pattern of low growth.
Still, it is somewhat disturbing that the model produces such low predicted price-earnings ratios upon the implementation of a takeover. To rectify this, Table 6 calculates g and T under the assumption that each firm will set c equal to p , the maximum allowed by law, starting immediately and continuing into the future. This departure from historical precedent allows the model to produce seemingly more price-earning takeover ratios. However, for four of the firms even with projected price-earnings ratios well over twenty-five one cannot justify the current relative price of the preferred and common shares.
Preferred Share Voting Rights -The Related Literature
There is some recent academic research that sheds light on the various hypothetical "expropriation" scenarios discussed here. Zingales (1994) vote. In addition, the dividends to the Russian preferred shares are bounded below by dividends to common shareholders. Unless the common is closely-held by management which is potentially tempted to drain the assets of the firm through corporate perquisites and other shady mechanisms, it would seem unlikely that the Italian experience helps explain the Russian one. Furthermore, as noted earlier, management's mechanism for draining value must include relatively high cash payments to the common relative to the preferred shareholders.
Smith and Amaoko-Adu (1995) use merger data from the Toronto Stock Exchange to investigate the price gap between "super-voting" shares and common shares. They find that supervoting shares get advantageous terms in mergers -57% on average. Thus, while the super-voting premium in share price is modest -5 to 10 percent -the price premium commanded by super-voting shares apparently reflects advantageous merger terms times the probability that a merger will occur.
While some Canadian firms have adopted "coat-tail" provisions that require acquiring firms to tender for minority shares at prices paid to the majority this protection is insufficient to guarantee that those with the lion's share of the vote do not take the lion's share of the acquisition premium.
The Russian market has both similarities and differences with the Canadian market. If an individual, legal entity and/or group of affiliated companies acquires 30% or more of a company's shares, the buyer(s) must offer to purchase all shareholder's stakes at the weighted-average market price over the previous six months. 13 While this provision prevents an acquiring firm from expropriating all minority shareholder value, it does limit the amount payable to minority shareholders to the pre-acquisition price level -in other words, minority shareholders will not necessarily get any premium in a merger. Apparently, the law only requires those making a tender offer for 30% or more of a class to purchase shares in that class on a pro-rata basis. It does not impose a similar requirement across classes. Thus, it would be surprising to find that an acquiring firm did not tender first for the common, and then buy the preferred at the six-month average of the pre-acquisition price levels. Given these restrictions it would appear to be a stretch to fit the Smith and Amaoko-Adu results to the current market prices in Russia.
The hypothesis that the common shareholders earn any takeover premium while the preferred shareholders do not -would further suggest that the discount of Russian preferred shares should be higher if acquiring firms in Russia pay a high premium when they make a tender offer. This is a potentially testable hypothesis. The international mergers database SDC records 1,129 mergers or acquisitions for Russian companies. These include consummated, pending, rumored and 24 failed transactions involving publicly traded firms during the period. This simple count gives some measure of the merger and acquisition activity involving Russian companies since the beginning of privatization -clearly there has been an active market for corporate control in Russia, and thus the probability of an acquisition of any given company is not zero.
Correlated Changes Among Firms
The degree to which preferred shareholders (or common shareholders) are put at risk of being expropriated depends on shareholder protection, which in turn is a function of the legal and regulatory framework of corporate governance. As noted earlier the perceived risk of expropriation in Russia is so great that the president himself has made it a top priority. This section explores the extent to which there may exist a common factor related to expropriation concerns. As noted previously, a common factor -if it exists -reflects the market's interpretation of governance risks, not necessarily the true ex ante probability of such expropriation occurring. 
shown in the Table 7 . A reasonably high proportion of variance can be attributed to the first component: 61% --suggestive of a common factor. Perhaps more importantly, the factor loadings for the first component are positive for all firms in the sample. This indicates the presence of a common factor to which all respond in the same way.
To test for co-movement in the relative valuation of common and preferred shares across firms a non-parametric test that focuses on directions of movements rather than magnitude is also examined. This is important because the quality of time series data may be questionable, and relatively rare events may be informative. Consider the observed ratio of common to preferred prices for firm i on the date t, . On a given date the price of a common share, , can decrease
), remain unchanged, or increase, compared to the previous close. The same can be said about the price of preferred, . Suppose that on some day the price of the common decreased and p it P the price of preferred increased. Then, on such a day, the ratio of common to preferred prices is said to have improved. This may be a day when news was released which the market interpreted as
positive news for the preferred shareholders and negative news for the common shareholders. For example, news that expropriating preferred share value became more difficult. Define the indicator variable that takes the value of 1 on the days of improvement in the ratio, and the value of 0,
The superscript i stands for "improvement". Similarly, define the indicator variable ( ) w it Y to mark the days when the ratio of common to preferred prices had worsened, because the common price has increased while the preferred price has decreased.
Finally, define a random variable that indicates that either common to preferred price ratio improved or it worsened on date t, . This variable measures whether or not some event (either positive or Since the price ratio controls for traditional market factors, the systematic changes observed in the data cannot be due to changes in the value of the overall economy. Rather the common component indicates that some central influence simultaneously changes the value of the preferred relative to the common. Off hand, changes in the perceived legal standing of each class would appear to be a good candidate for the underlying cause, thus implying that corporate control issues capture at least some of the observed price discrepancies.
Conclusion
Russia is a great market in which to study exposure to corporate governance risk. It is now the "Wild West" of corporate control. This paper examines a phenomenon that appears to violate the law of one price; the spread between preferred and common shares. The gap can only be explained by extreme scenarios relying upon immanent and major failures of investor protection. The analysis suggests that the preferred share discount is hard to explain by reasonable models of shareholder expropriation or merger, even under extremely pessimistic assumptions. The models analyzed here suggest that expropriation would have to involve the expected seizure of more than 65% of shareholder value by one class of shareholders within about four or five years to justify the current differential. Alternatively, an acquisition scenario would have to involve a huge premium, coupled with a high level of certainty that the merger would go through in order to justify the current spread in share prices. While none of these explanations can be logically ruled out, they seem improbable.
By using the relative value of common and preferred shares, one can then back out and quantify the implied investor concerns about expropriation and compare them to feasible strategies and realistic ex ante probabilities.
The analysis is consistent with two possible explanations. First, overly-pessimistic views of the potential for management fraud may be at work. While Russian shares as a group may reflect a discount for such possibilities, the split between preferred and common shares would seem far too large to reflect anything other than extreme, and possibly unwarranted negative sentiment. Second, it may be that rational investors are simply producing price series like those found in multiple equilibria models of asset pricing such as Spiegel (1998) . Differentiating between the two explanations will require additional data about corporate fundamentals.
Developing precedent and further regulatory activity may be expected to alleviate apparent shareholder concerns about the potential vulnerability of preferred claims to expropriation and takeovers, and indeed may already have caused some convergence. If nothing else, the analytic framework in this paper offers a means for investors to more formally structure their prior beliefs about adverse events. This structure, in turn, has the potential to help ascertain what a set of reasonable assumptions about such events may imply about the relative value of Russian preferred and common shares.
The price difference between Russian common and preferred shares is of much more than academic interest. For investors in the Russian market, the differential suggests the potential profitability of investing in the preferred shares, conditional upon rational evaluation of the probabilities of various corporate events that impact relative value. For Russian companies, a major concern is the cost of capital. The analysis indicates that the yields on the preferred shares are higher than is warranted by discount and growth rates implied by the common. This would suggest it is 29 profitable for Russian firms to buy back their preferred shares at prevailing market prices and finance such activity with new common equity issues. Of course, if that happened, this would raise the price of the preferred shares.
The illiquidity and infrequent trading of Russian shares is a major barrier to the empirical analysis, however it should be recognized that these are endogenous factors. If, indeed, the observed ratios are due to investor fears of expropriation it might cause the public anonymous market for securities to dry up. The low point in the volume of Russian share trading occurred at the same time that the average ratio of common and preferred of the five most liquid firms reached a maximum.
While macroeconomic, global factors are typically cited for the Russian 1997 crisis, it is worth considering that concerns about a corporate governance meltdown may have caused severe distortions in relative valuations in the period since the 1997 crisis. The amounts shown are per-share cash dividend amounts, in Russian rubles. Zero means that explicit decision to omit the dividend was made. Empty cell means no data is reported for the year. Common is on the first line, preferred (indicated by "P" at the end of the ticker symbol) is on the second line. The numbers shown are exact (not rounded) dividend amounts. Notes: Matching U.S. firms are the ten firms with the closest market capitalizations to the market capitalization of the Russian security. For example, the matching sample for Lukoil contains two sets of ten U.S. stocks. The first set has the ten closest in market value to the market value of Lukoil common, the second set the ten closest in market value to the Lukoil preferred. Each set of ten contains five with market capitalizations above and five below the matching security. Notes: Expropriation Level: 100% means common takes everything. The variable T represents within how many years said expropriation would have to take place to explain the current common to preferred price ratio. A value of 0 implies that even immediate expropriation may be insufficient. g = growth rate, r = interest rate, =expropriation level. Notes: The model takes the merger premium and the interest rate r as given and then solves for g and T. Merger Premium: 1 equals a 100% premium, 10 a 1000% premium, etcetera. The value of T states that the current common to preferred price ratio can only be explained if a takeover occurs within T years, the firm continues to grow at a rate g between now and then, and the discount rate equals r. A value of T=0 implies an immediate takeover at the multiple of m will not equilibrate the value of the preferred and common shares. P CT /E T equals the model's implied price-earnings ratio for the common shares at the takeover date T. This value depends only upon the implied growth and interest rates, and not on T, since the takeover price is assumed to grow proportionately with earnings. Notes: Historically the common has received a lower dividend per share than the preferred. The calculations in this table assume that going forward the common will receive an amount equal to the preferred, which is the maximum allowed by law. The model takes the merger premium and the interest rate r as given and then solves for g and T.
Merger Premium: 1 equals a 100% premium, 10 a 1000% premium, etcetera. The value of T states that the current common to preferred price ratio can only be explained if a takeover occurs within T years, the firm continues to grow at a rate g between now and then, and the discount rate equals r. A value of T=0 implies an immediate takeover at the multiple of m will not equilibrate the value of the preferred and common shares. P CT /E T equals the model's implied price-earnings ratio for the common shares at the takeover date T. This value depends only upon the implied growth and interest rates, and not on T, since the takeover price is assumed to grow proportionately with earnings. 
